To the knowledge of the author, this is the first time it has been shown that interest rates that are extremely high by modern standards are necessary within a zero-sum monetary system. Extreme interest rates persisted for long periods of time in many places. Prior to the invention of banking, most money was hard-money in the form of some type of coin. Here a model is presented that examines the interest rate required to succeed as an investor in a zero-sum hard-money system. Even when the playing field is significantly tilted toward the investor, interest rates need to be much higher than expected. In a completely fair zero-sum system, an investor cannot break even without charging 100% interest. Even with a 5% advantage, an investor won't break even at 15% interest. From this it is concluded that what we consider usurious rates today are, within a hard-money system, driven by necessity.
Introduction
A system where the amount of money is fixed is kind of zero-sum game -for every winner, there must be a loser, because new money is not created that allows interest or investment return payouts from any other source. The game examined here is artificial, but it models an important sector of monetary behavior -hard currency systems. Hard currency systems predate the invention of banking and they have cropped up recently in most of the crypto-currencies, of which Bitcoin is the most well-known example. This kind of monetary system has special issues that are not commonly appreciated.
Interest rates have long been a topic of concern, as high interest rates have historically been a way that the world's poor are kept in poverty. This has led to the laws against usury [1] , and rules against lending for interest in some religions.
Prior to the invention of banking, during periods when physical coin was the monetary system, much of the ancient world's money supply was rather inflexible. With money creation either barely keeping pace with economic needs, or lagging behind, systems approximating zero-sum money existed.
Examining zero-sum money is interesting in the modern world because of many new cryptocurrencies that create electronic analogs of physical coin. Most of these currencies are designed to create a limited amount of electronic coins, with the idea that limited availability supports currency exchange price vis-à-vis existing currencies.
Simple zero-sum investor game.
This simple version of the zero-sum investor game introduces the problem. Let us play a zero-sum game using small numbers of coins to examine the problem of interest rates. In this game there are three players. An investor, A, a borrower, B, and a competitor, C. In the game, players B and C will engage in transactions with each other. Player A provides a loan to player B, at some interest rate. After some arbitrary number of transactions, we stop the game and pay off player A. We will assume that all transaction outcomes are equally likely in this version of the game.
Three player investment game.
The first version of the zero-sum game will start as shown in figure 1 , with 10 coins in the game. Player A has 5 coins. The other 5 coins are held by player C. Player B receives a loan from player A. We will assume initially that player B and player C are equally good at the game and that all outcomes are equally probable. This game assumes Player A has a serious problem. Player A has 5 ways to lose money, 1 way to make nothing, and only 5 ways make money -but he only makes one coin each time. So, if player A has 10 iterations of the game, and outcomes are evenly distributed, then he must lose overall, as shown in Table 1 . What interest rate is needed for player A to break even on his investments? The number is much higher than most would guess. Player A has to charge 100% interest to break even in this game as seen in Table 2 . The simple interest has to be over 100% for Player A to average simple breakeven, if both players start even. For player A, the investor, to win more than he loses over a large number of rounds, the game must be skewed by having more upside possibility than downside.
Multi-player game using Gaussian distribution.
Now let us look at a more realistic case with many players in the game. To do this we will add the assumption that outcomes of many transactions of many players will follow a Gaussian distribution that averages to zero. This model assumes that all players transact freely, without hoarding, and that players include three classes that correspond to players A, B and C. By shifting the distribution to the positive side by rigging the game's odds, an investor can make money. Even so, this can only occur up to the limit of the money in the game.
The ability of an investor to win at this game requires a higher level of interest than one might expect, even with significant "thumb on the scales" tilting to advantage the investor. 
Discussion
Without banking to make credit available as needed, or the ability to otherwise expand the money supply in concert with economic activity, interest payments can only cannibalize existing to pay winners. There must be a loss for every gain.
This conundrum means that in a zero-sum game, a rational player rigs the game, or else charges outrageous amounts of interest/investment return. History has recorded that both responses to investment risk have been common. Historical accounts of interest rates far exceeding 100% exist, and often it is presumed that these interest rates were necessarily evidence of greed without rationality.
Even in a zero-sum game in which rationality and understanding is not assumed, repeated iterations will evolve players who play the game according to winner's rules.
We can see evidence of this in past centuries in which usury was regularly attacked and social rules made to control it, generally to little avail.
For instance, the ancient Jewish temple system had periodic jubilees when all debts were forgiven [2] . The temple received tithes, so its money supply was consistently replenished, allowing it to make hard currency loans. Tithes allowed loan activity to continue in a zero-sum system that did not charge excessive interest. I would observe that the net result of the jubilee system was that it would also tend to limit the growth of secular power by non-temple lenders, since secular lenders were also subject to jubilee rules, but did not replenish their money with tithes.
There are also records of presumed hard-money systems in which interest rates were low. Ancient Rome and Greece had common nominal rates on the order of 1% per month, and sometimes loans were available as low as 4% per year. The Roman Empire, in its peak, had nominal rates on the order of 1% per month, although rates exceeding the legal limit of 12% occurred frequently [3] . Given what figures 1-4 show, one has to ask how such low interest rates would be possible to support within a hard-money system.
In Rome of Julius Caesar's time, Brutus charged 48%, rates as high as 48% per month (10,900% per year) are recorded in ancient Athens, and 52%-120% per year in 12 th century England [4] . Such rates are more consistent with the zero-sum game discussed here.
How ancient Rome could have operated a hard-money system with low interest rates can be looked at in several ways. First, there was probably a significant difference between the nominal official interest rate in Rome and what ordinary borrowers could get access to.
Second, the Roman Empire was an expanding system for centuries taking in new treasure from conquered regions. With plunder providing increases to the money supply, low cost slave labor, mining of precious metals, and mostly restricting money to the citizen elite and an upper class of slaves, the money supply could meet or exceed needs for long periods. This could create periods in which an excess of hard-money obtained by plunder and seignorage would allow periods of low interest rates in the core of the empire because, in effect, the money supply was not limited for that particular group.
Third, the wealthiest, most powerful class could afford to lose significant amounts of money because the society was rigged to supply them with more. Private parties with high levels of wealth could thus have been tied into the plunder system of various empires.
Finally, there is evidence that deposits existed in Roman times, and some degree of banking-like transactions [4] . It is plausible that the money supply due to money creation in the modern sense was somewhat larger than the hard-money supply because of the use of accountants and letters to exchange large amounts of money that were inconvenient to transport physically.
Conclusion
The interest requirements for investors in hard-money systems are considerably higher than most realize. Without corruption to rig the outcome, it is impossible for an investor class to make money in a hard-money system that does not have regular, managed, inflow of hard currency. Within that investor class, stochastic variation will create winners and losers in a fair system, but the class as a whole will not. Only within hard money systems that harvest a regular supply of new commodity money (e.g. gold, silver, gemstones or other commodity money) and manage the release of that money into the hard-currency system can interest rates fall below the 100% level and reward investors as a class.
Cryptocurrencies are neo-coin systems within the context of a more sophisticated monetary mechanism of fiat currency and money creation by loans. The inability to virtualize money prevents creation of new money, so that system becomes zero-sum.
Therefore, within the bounds of a cryptocurrency system that limits money creation, interest rates must rise to levels that the modern world considers usury. Consequently, it
is impossible for such a system of electronic coinage to expand and become the primary currency of any modern economy.
